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IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?

INDIRECT TAXATION THROUGH EXPROPRIATION OF
REGULATORY AGENCY SPECIAL FUNDS:
THE BUDGET GETS UGLY AND
THE LEGISLATURE GETS MEAN
The regulatory agencies of California,
with few exceptions, are financed from
·'special funds." The industry or trade
regulated is assessed license or other fees
to finance the public agency overseeing it.
The nature of these funds should not be
misunderstood; they operate as indirect
taxes on the consumers of the services
regulated. A fee imposed across an industry by state assessment is passed on to
the consumers of that industry. However,
a case can be made that if a trade or industry requires regulation, it probably inures to the benefit of consumers using the
services involved (at least in theory) and
they are therefore the appropriate parties
to pay for it.
During each of the past two years, the
legislature and the Governor-through
the budget process-have required the
transfer of special fund monies to the
general fund, to assist the state in
ameliorating its huge budget deficit. The
state has robbed Peter and Paul to pay
itself.

"Special Funds"
Means Special Funds
Most of the agencies monitored in this
publication are "special-funded" agencies-that is, they are supported solely by
fees collected from their licensees and applicants for licensure, fines, and reimbursement for investigative costs. They are
created in an "enabling act" and, in almost
every case, authorized to collect fees from
their licensees for deposit into a special
fund which is to be used "to carry out the
provisions of this chapter" or "for support
of this board" (emphasis added).1
The legal status of special funds has
been discussed in two California Supreme
Court cases addressing diversion of special-fund money by the legislature for purposes arguably unrelated to the subject
agency's function,2 and a 1976 Attorney
General"s Opinion addressing the author-

ity of the Department of Consumer Affairs
(DCA) to assess the special funds of its
constituent agencies for use by its
Division of Consumer Services for activities "reasonably related" to the activities of the agencies.3
In Daugherty v. Riley, 4 the California
Supreme Court invalidated a legislative
diversion from the Corporations
Commissioner's special fund, noting that
monies in the Commissioner's fund were
collected from "fees for permits and licenses required by law to be issued as a prerequisite to the initiation or the carrying
on of business.'' 5 Further, these fees,
which constituted the "sole suiwort" of the
Department of Corporations, were collected pursuant to a statute providing that
they were to be deposited into the corporation commission fund "'to be used by the
commissioner in carrying out this act. "'7
The Supreme Court likened the
Commissioner's special fund to "a trust
fund raised for a particular purpose in the
exercise by the state of its police power.''8
The Court noted:
They are not state revenues in
the sense that they may be used for
any state purpose so long as the
department is not in need of them,
and the justification for their collection is to make the department
self-supporting .... That these special funds are raised for regulatory
purposes and are set apart for the
exclusive use of the state departments and agencies for which they
are imposed and collected cannot
be doubted. That these funds may
not be permanently diverted from
their specific purposes and to such
an extent as to render the department or agency unable to function
is likewise clear. 9
In Urban v. Riley, to the Supreme Court
was asked to rule on the validity of a
similar legislative diversion from the Real
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Estate Commissioner's special fund. The
language of the Real Estate Act differed
from the language of the Corporate
Securities Act at issue in Daugheny, however, in that the Real Estate Act expressly
provided for an annual transfer of excess
funds from the Real Estate Commissioner's fund to the general fund. Thus, the
Court distinguished Daugheny and its
"trust fund" concept. With regard to the
constitutionality of a statute mandating
regular transfer of excess special fund
monies to the general fund, the Court "assume[d], without deciding," that the legislature is not precluded from enacting such
a law, noting that "the mere fact that an
enactment providing for regulatory fees
may incidentally produce some revenue
does not render such enactment unconstitutional."11
In a I 976 opinion, the Attorney
General ruled that DCA may assess the
special funds of its constituent agencies
for its activities which are "reasonab~
related" to the activities of its agencies.
Funding for anything unrelated properly
comes from the general fund. Hence, since
DCA is an umbrella agency over 38
boards, commissions, and bureaus, and
performs numerous administrative and
other tasks for them, it may extract a pro
rata charge to finance its overhead, its
Division of Consumer Services, and its
Division of Administration. Although the
Attorney General opined that the "trust
fund" language in Daugherty has been
"substantially qualified" since its issuance
(with which we do not necessarily agree),
and that Urban v. Riley appears to hold that
the legislature is not constitutionally
precluded from diverting excess fees from
special funds so long as the fees imposed
do not arbitrarily or unreasonably burden
licensees, the AG also found:
To the extent that monies derived from pro rata assessment are
used for activities unrelated to the
individual funds, under the principles set forth in Urban v. Riley,
supra, support of such activities
from the individual funds would be
unconstitutional in that the monies
collected to support such activities
would be disproportionate to the
contemplated expense of regulation of the boards, bureaus, and
commissions within the Department of Consumer Affairs. 13

The Budget Crisis Hits:
Thou Shalt Not Tax;
No, Thou Shalt Not
CALL It Taxes
During early 1991, the California
legislature faced a fiscal crisis of unpreceI

Ir
dented scope. The state had estimated
revenues at levels 10-20% above those
likely to accrue. The shortfall was staggering. Eventual estimates reached $ I 4 billion out of a $55 billion total budget. Further, most of the state budget is earmarked,
meaning that the actual cuts as applied
only to the discretionary part of the budget
could eviscerate the public sector. That is,
a 20% overall funding cut would perhaps
require a 30-40% cut in many programs,
including law enforcement and justice,
services for the very poor, and-most
critically-efforts to assist children. The
accounts for children had already been
quietly cut by the state, which never has
properly factored indices of need, or even
population increases of children, in cal14
culating budgets year to year. The infrastructure, safety net, and societal investment in our collective future had been
undercut for years-and now this.
The legislature faced a profound
dilemma. Of course, there was an answer.
What does a family do when an emergency strikes? It does not place its infants in
paper bags and toss them off bridges. It
digs deep. In a recession, we try to stimulate business and employment, and we
may delay space projects, defense spending, park acquisition, and many other
things-but we do not forsake our
children. The members who have extra
contribute. The recession means that
many are worse off, but some are
desperate; there are priorities and there are
choices. Indeed, all things are relative, and
for the state of California-one of the
wealthiest poliucaljurisdictions in the history of the world-to forswear the ability
to immunize its children, or to provide
elementary medical care, or to feed the
hungry, is pathetic. But the "taxes are too
high, business will leave" nonsense
precluded the modest increases required,
notwithstanding a list of billions of dollars
of existing tax subsidies for the powerful
(e.g., oil depletion, bank and insurance
breaks). Ending these indirect "tax" expenditures would not drive out business in
any debilitating way.
The legislature and Governor faced the
issue to a limited extent in 1991, producing some needed revenues. And at the
same time they started thrashing around
looking for money where it might not be
called "taxes"; the special funds of the
agencies became a target. During the summer of 199 J, Governor Wilson signed AB
222 (Vasconcellos). Section 14 of this bill
required the transfer of all "excess fees
incidentally produced" by state regulatory
agencies to the general fund on June 30,
1992. Such "excess fees" were defined to
mean that an agency could keep the funds
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it needed to meet its 1991-92 fiscal year
budget, plus that needed for three additional months-all monies over this
amount were taken by the general fund.
Predictably, agencies responded to this by
delaying planned fee increases, or by
spending money quickly, to avoid having
their funds taken. Nevertheless, the short
notice produced some remarkable grabs.
The Contractors State License Board, an
agency relied upon to enforce standards
affecting many consumers, lost almost
$23 million to the general fund. The immediate consequence of this legislative
taking was the indirect taxation of consumers for general fund purposes, the
agencies' avoidance of needed fee increases to assure consumer protection out
of fear of general fund expropriation, and
a decline in enforcement.

The Auctioneer Commission's
Challenge to Legislative Illegality
Only one agency attempted to challenge this taking in court. Lo and behold,
in May 1992 the humble Auctioneer Commission filed a lawsuit challenging the
validity of section 14 of AB 222 to block
the taking of its excess reserve fund. At
this point, the legislature was embroiled in
Stage Two of the budget crisis: The
shortfall of 1991-92 was substantially
replicated for 1992-93, except now the
Republican Governor was determined to
stand on principle. Read his lips; down in
the polls, he would not tax. Well, he would
not tax where it would be called taxes.
Amid much wringing of hands by the
legislature and Governor, the special interests continued to ply the halls of
Sacramento to preserve billions in special
tax subsidies and perks for the oil, alcohol.
banking, and insurance industries, and to
preserve inequitable property tax
windfalls for businesses paying at 1978
assessments, business lunch and yacht
club deductions, law student and medical
student education for wealthy students at
publicly financed schools. and ... well, you
get the idea.
The search was on for the weak and
uninformed. How to get money and not
call it taxation-special fund expropriation was again irresistible. There is the
money; it is in hand. We have to be a bit
careful in stealing the state pension trust
money, but here-in the arena of these
almost invisible regulatory agencies-we
can take by stealth and bury it all in accounting mumbo-jumbo. Except those
pesky Auctioneers have the gall to avail
themselves of the checks and balances
which assure the rule oflaw; they've gone
and filed suit.

The Legislature's Response to
The Auctioneers' Challenge:
The Bully Retaliates, or
''Going... Going ... Gone''
Well. there is a predictable consequence to the enragement of a bully who
Jacks conscience. The legislature completely defunded the Auctioneer Commission in the 1992-93 budget. One might
argue that criminally buttressed standards
might suffice to regulate the state's auctioneers, and perhaps the Auctioneer
Commission is a legitimate object of
deregulation. Except the legislature did
not make a deregulation analysis, and
deregulation of a special-funded agency
does not produce revenue or effectuate
savings. Nor has the legislature considered the defunding (or deregulation) of
any number of other agencies equally
deserving of merciful death (the Board of
Landscape Architects, the Engineers
board, and many others). The legislature
simply decided it had to destroy an adversary to prevent the issue from reaching the
courts, to cloak its illegality, to get away
scot-free. And it worked. Although the suit
is still pending technically, there is no
plaintiff to pursue it.
Amazingly, the legislature did not
change the relevant statute. You still must
have an auctioneer's license to be an auctioneer, but there is no one to license you;
you still have to post a bond, but there is
no one to post it with. Judge Roy Bean was
more sagacious; at least he didn't shoot the
plaintiff-and before the trial commenced.

1992: The Tiger is Loose;
Grab Your Children
Having avoided comeuppance by
literally destroying the objector, the legislature and the Governor were feeling
desperation from the continuing shortfall
and their inability to tax, but they had
found an opening into one source of
money and now were ready to pounce
hard. Yes, it's illegal, but this is politics.
The newly signed 1992-93 budget requires almost all special-funded agencies
to cut their 1992-93 expenditures (from
1991-92 levels) by I0%, and to transfer
that 10% to the general fund on June 30.
1993. That is a huge cut, especially for the
smaller agencies. For many, meaningful
discipline to protect the public is
precluded. Query whether such agencies
should exist at all where relied upon to
provide a measure of protection they cannot physically provide? But they had a use
for the legislature and the Governor: They
had money and the ability to assess fees
("fees," not "taxes'').
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The new budget does not authorize
cuts in license fees, just in expenditures,
across the board and without regard to
need or justification or consequence. The
savings produced by this reduction become excess funds which will be taken
next June. Last year, our lawmakers
stripped these special-funded agencies of
"excess" reserve funds. This time, the
taking is the equivalent of a direct assessment on the operating budgets of specialfunded agencies. The legislature may be
able to alter its statutes to permit such a
contribution, but it cannot do so solely
through the budget process (which is
bound by existing law) nor can it do so
retroactively. Even if we generously concede to the bare legality of the I 991 move
under Urban, the 1992 theft directly from
the special funds of these regulatory agencies for purposes wholly unrelated to the
agencies' functions falls squarely into the
unconstitutional hole identified by the
California Supreme Court in Daugherty
and grudgingly admitted by the Attorney
General in his 1976 opinion.

The Legacy of Special Fund
Taking: Agency Impotence
This official "theft" of money gathered
for a specific purpose allows the special
interests who largely control the agencies
purportedly regulating them to object to
any further increases in fees. "The last
time we agreed to a fee increase, the legislature took it for the general fund. We
aren't going to do it again," they will
argue. They will then wax self-righteous
all over the Capitol and stop any fee increase for years thereafter, using the
general fund leakage as their rationale.
This will accomplish two purposes for
them: It allows them to tell their membership that they have stood up for their
economic interests, and it allows them to
prevent any meaningful reform or
strengthening of the discipline systems
financed by those fees.
You might ask what difference it
makes how an industry trade association
or political action committee feels about a
fee assessment to finance the regulation of
its members. You might ask, but you won't
if you know anything about state government. Unless there are unusual circumstances, the industry or trade must
sign off on a fee increase or it will not
happen. Those who hold fast to ninthgrade civics principles (and God bless
you) will rightly ask, "Wait a second! How
did they get this veto power? Have the
inmates taken over the asylum?" The
answer is that they have taken over the
whole town.

Why would the trade association lobbyists who speak for an industry care
about a fee which is passed on to consumers? Not because they care about consumers. Nor is it much of a burden for
most licensees. For example, the extra
$ I00 per year needed to finance a decent
system of physician discipline is not much
to ask from doctors. The total dues of the
California Medical Associat10n are at least
four times greater than the license and
related fees paid by physicians. If proper
regulation reduces medical malpractice
claims by but 3%, much more than $100
per physician would be saved on the
$25,000-$50,000 in annual malpractice
insurance premiums many of them pay.
The next question is why a trade association would object to a minor increase
of this amount to finance the protection of
the public from incompetent or dishonest
practitioners. After all, aren't most
physicians (or other professionals) competent and honest and desirous of excising
those who are not from their profession?
Yes, most are. But their trade associations
and PACs do not represent those instincts.
Rather, they tend to represent the "territory" of the profession or trade, including the interests of those who abuse the
public. This predilection is an empirical
constant of trade association behavior.

Conclusion
Okay, there is an emergency. But
where there is an emergency, take emergency action. Tax the wealthy; they have
benefitted from tremendous tax cuts over
the past ten years. Tax oil; California is
one of the few states which does not tax
the oil taken from its soil. Tax insurance
and banking; they are both now cross-subsidized by other taxpayers. There are
many alternatives. Interestingly, a recent
poll commissioned by Children's Hospitals found that even the heavily taxed middle class would be willing to pay a bit
more if the money were to go for the
benefit of children-who are the ones disproportionately suffering from the current
shortfall. In fact, the margin of public concern about underfunding those most in
need is remarkable, with almost 70% willing to pay more in taxes for these purposes. But, rather than presenting such an
alternative or engaging in honest discourse, both the legislature and Governor
are skulking around and stealing money
from funds dedicated to a particular use,
violating the rule of law in doing so, and
retaliating against one legitimately attempting to invoke court judgment. These
are not the methods of responsible or
honest government.
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ENDNOTES
l. See, e.g., Business and Professions
Code sections 2682 (Physical Therapy
Fund), 2814 (Board of Registered Nursing
Fund), 2894 (Vocational Nurse and
Psychiatric Technician Examiners Fund),
2981 (Psychology Fund), 3150 (Optometry Fund), 3455 (Hearing Aid Dispensers Fund), 4842.2 (Animal Health
Technician Examining Committee Fund),
4904 (Board of Examiners in Veterinary
Medicine Contingent Fund), 4994 (Behavioral Science Examiners Fund), 5133
(Accountancy Fund), 5602 (Board of Architectural Examiners Fund), 6797
(Professional Engineer's and Land
Surveyor's Fund), 8030 (Shorthand
Reporters' Fund), 8676 (Structural Pest
Control Fund), 9770 (Cemetery Fund).
The physicians of California, politically able to insist upon somewhat more assiduous guardianship of their money, are
exceedingly explicit in protecting the
Contingent Fund of the Medical Board of
California. Business and Professions
Code section 2445 currently provides, in
pertinent part: "The contingent fund shall
be for the use of the board and from it shall
be paid all salaries and all other expenses
necessarily incurred in carrying into effect
the provisions of this chapter. If there is
any surplus in these receipts after the
board's salaries and expenses are paid,
such surplus shall be applied solely to
expenses incurred under the provisions of
this chapter. No surplus in these receipts
shall be deposited in or transferred to the
General Fund'' (emphasis added).
2. Urban v. Riley, 21 Cal. 2d 232
(1942); Daugherty v. Riley, I Cal. 2d 298
(1934).
3. 59 Op. Att'y Gen. 282, No. CV
75-334 (Apr. 30, 1976).
4. I Cal. 2d 298 (1934).
5. Id. at 303.
6. ld.
7. Id. at 305, citing section 28 of the
Corporate Securities Act.
8. Id. at 308.
9. Id. at 308-09.
IO. 21 Cal. 2d 232 (1942).
II.Id. at 237.
12. 59 Op. Att'y Gen. 282 (1976).
13. Id. at 292 (emphasis original).
14. A study by the Children's Advocacy Institute has determined that per
capita inflation-adjusted spending for
children has been declining steadily from
at least the 1980s, long before the 1991
emergency. Children's Advocacy Institute, 1988-1992 California Children s
Budget: Some Preliminary Findings (July
2, 1992).
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